The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has issued Safety Directive 16-5 to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) that requires the transit agency to address the stop signal overruns in its Metrorail system. The safety directive calls for WMATA to implement 11 required actions and to expedite completion of prior corrective actions approved by the FTA.
“WMATA has taken many of the steps that DOT has required to improve safety,” stated U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx. “However, until there are no stop signal overruns, WMATA can, and must, do more. The FTA new required actions will help reduce the likelihood of future occurrences and keep Metrorail passengers and workers safer.”
The Safety Directive is based on six findings set out in FTA's new Stop Signal Overrun Investigation. The report finds that, although WMATA has taken steps to prevent the overruns, the agency can do more to identify and mitigate the systemic deficiencies and operational concerns that allow them to occur.
The FTA investigation focused on four main areas: the frequency of stop signal overruns, identifying the potential consequences of these events, clarifying contributing factors to these events, and assessing the adequacy of WMATA’s current actions and programs to prevent these incidents.
The investigation, which was conducted from March to July 2016, was initiated due to the following:
- in 2015, the Metrorail system had more stop signal overruns than in either of the previous two years;
- the FTA’s review of individual stop signal overrun incidents since October 2015 identified potential issues that required system-wide analysis and evaluation; and
- a near-miss collision at Smithsonian Station on February 3, 2016, highlighted the potential catastrophic consequences associated with these events.
The safety findings detailed in the report address three key areas: a lack of WMATA train operator familiarity with mainline and yard territory, train operator inattention or confusion when departing from a station or terminal or moving under zero speed commands, and deficient communications between the train operator and the Rail Operations Control Center.
FTA also agrees with a previous stop signal overrun assessment by WMATA, which found that pressures placed on train operators to maintain schedule for operational reasons may cause or contribute to these events.
Under the FTA’s direct safety oversight since October 2015, WMATA has taken of number of steps to address the causes that contribute to stop signal overruns. However, in its recent report, the FTA finds that WMATA must increase its efforts to prevent the overruns and intends to work with WMATA to ensure that WMATA continues to make timely progress towards fulfilling FTA’s requirements.
FTA Acting Administrator Carolyn Flowers said, “The FTA acknowledges WMATA’s commitment to reducing the frequency of stop signal overrun incidents, but it must do better to prevent such incidents and improve its investigation process in order to develop more effective risk-mitigation measures.”
As directed by Safety Directive 16-5, WMATA must develop corrective action plans to address the findings of the report and related required actions. The proposed corrective action plans are subject to FTA approval, and FTA will monitor the agency’s progress to implement the safety improvements.